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In 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of the United States decided a case 
of an undocumented noncitizen that went against United States Su-
preme Court precedent. The appellant in Marinelarena v. Sessions 
was removed despite the fact that she had not been convicted of any 
crimes. This comment examines the arguments and strategies of the 
case that the judges relied upon in their opinion. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 23, 2017, the United States Court of Appeal for the 9th Cir-
cuit found Aracely Marinelarena, an undocumented noncitizen, ineligible 
for cancellation of removal because she failed to show that her state convic-
tion did not relate to a federally controlled substance.1 For immigration pur-
poses, a noncitizen that commits a state offense can be removed if their 
state criminal offense matches the generic federal statutory definitions.2 
Once a noncitizen is deemed removable, she may petition for cancellation 
of removal on grounds of inadmissibility if she can prove that she has not 
been convicted of any crime listed under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.3 However, in the present case, the 9th Circuit determined that Ms. 
Marinelarena failed to prove that she was not convicted of a removable of-
fense simply due to the inconclusive status of her state conviction record, 
and was, therefore, still subject to removal.4 This comment argues that the 
9th Circuit, by sidestepping the United States Supreme Court and its pre-
scribed analytical method in crime-based immigration,5 arrived at an ill-
advised decision. Notably, this comment asserts that the 9th Circuit's argu-
ment not only directly collides with a higher authority, but also unfairly 
burdens a disadvantaged party with an unjustified duty.  
Part I explains the origins and organization of the categorical approach 
used to determine removability under the INA for criminal offenses under 
state law. Part II outlines Marinelarena v. Sessions and the arguments made 
according to the categorical approach. Finally, part III criticizes the 9th Cir-
                                               
1 Marinelarena v. Sessions, 869 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2017). 
2 Escobar v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2017). 
3 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2008).  
4 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d 780. 
5 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). 
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cuit's decision to abscond with the categorical approach. In conclusion, this 
comment argues that the 9th Circuit's flawed analysis of the categorical ap-
proach results in the accused being unduly burdened with proving their 
right to remain in the United States. 
I. CATEGORICAL APPROACH 
The categorical approach is an analytical method prescribed by the Su-
preme Court to determine whether a criminally convicted noncitizen can be 
removed from the United States under immigration law.6 Under this ap-
proach, immigration judges or the reviewing court may only analyze and 
compare the statutory definition of the convicted crime with its "generic 
federal definition".7 The Supreme Court reasoned that, "[b]y 'generic,' we 
mean the offenses must be viewed in the abstract, to see whether the state 
statute shares the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point of com-
parison."8 For purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the 
main goal is to determine "what the noncitizen was 'convicted' of, not what 
he did;"9 namely, the categorical approach "generally requires the trial court 
to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior 
offense" and "whether the noncitizen's actual conduct involved such facts 'is 
quite irrelevant.'"10  
Generally, the categorical approach can be summarized into three steps.11 
First, the immigration judge or the reviewing court must identify "the feder-
al immigration category relevant to the migrant's situation." In particular, it 
involves "perusing the INA for potentially applicable bases of removal."12 
Second, courts must determine the "least culpable conduct necessarily re-
quired for a conviction to occur under the statute of conviction," whereby a 
match can only occur "if a conviction of the state offense 'necessarily' in-
volved. . .facts equating to the generic federal offense."13 Specifically, im-
migration courts must honor and rely on the state's interpretation of its 
criminal law.14 Therefore, states are the final authority in this step of analy-
sis. 
                                               
6 CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 30 (2015). 
7 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599–600. 
8 Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013). 
9 Id. at 200. 
10 Id.; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
11 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 6, at 31. 
12 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2008). 
13 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 6, at 32; see also Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 200. 
14 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 6, at 32. 
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When the generic definition of the federal crime contains elements that 
exactly match or are narrower than that of the state statutory conviction, the 
state conviction is deemed to be a removable offense and, thus, completes 
the last step. However, if there's a "realistic probability, not a theoretical 
possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside 
the generic definition of a crime," the state offense is overbroad and the 
noncitizen cannot to be deemed removable.15 When a mismatch is final, the 
analysis also ends.16 
However, the last step of the categorical approach is not always as 
straightforward when a state statute is overbroad and divisible, that is, when 
it "sets out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative—for ex-
ample, stating that burglary involves entry into a building or an automo-
bile."17 When a statute is divisible, the analysis must include an extra step 
dubbed the "modified categorical approach."18 At this stage, the immigra-
tion judge must determine whether that state conviction "can be divided into 
discrete prongs," namely, "if one alternative. . .matches an element in the 
generic offense, but the other. . .does not."19 The immigration judge must 
then examine a narrow pool of relevant materials often referred to as 
"Shepard documents," including "charging documents, written plea agree-
ment, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the tri-
al judge to which the defendant assent."20 This supplemental step allows the 
court to "do what the categorical approach demands: compare the elements 
of the crime of conviction. . .with the elements of the generic crime," since 
"when a statute lists multiple, alternative elements," "it effectively creates 
'several different crimes.'"21 Once the particular conviction is identified, the 
analysis returns to the categorical approach where a comparison between 
the state conviction and the federal crime would be conducted.22 However, 
when a statute is overbroad and indivisible, it is a mismatch and the noncit-
izen cannot be removed for the particular state criminal conviction.23 A vis-
ual representation of the categorical approach is illustrated below in Exhibit 
1.  
                                               
15 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191. 
16 See id. at 192. 
17 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). 
18 Id. 
19 Id.; HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 6, at 31. 
20 See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005); HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 6, at 31. 
21 Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2281–85. 
22 See id. at 2283. 
23 See id. 
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As illustrated by Garcia Hernandez, the purpose of categorical ap-
proach's elements-but-not-facts focus is largely three-fold.24 First, as the 
Supreme Court aptly put, "conviction is the relevant statutory hook."25 Since 
Congress is silent as to how a state conviction is translated into a removal 
offense in the immigration context, the Supreme Court is obliged to define 
the term and more importantly, to "ensure[s] that everyone convicted of the 
same removable offenses is treated identically instead of removal turning on 
what some did and could have been convicted of."26 Second, in light of the 
Sixth Amendment, the categorical approach ensures that only those facts 
that are found by a unanimous jury to be beyond a reasonable doubt would 
be admitted into the analytical process for immigration purposes.27 Third, by 
setting factual boundaries around the analysis, the Supreme Court sets out 
to "promote[] judicial and administrative efficiency by precluding the reliti-
gation of past convictions in minitrials conducted long after the fact."28 Be-
cause immigration proceedings are civil and, thus, unequipped for criminal 
investigations and proceedings, applying the categorical approach would 
effectively streamline the practice and ensure proper efficiency.  
II. MARINELARENA V. SESSIONS 
In Marinelarena v. Sessions, the court is concerned with two major is-
sues.29 First, whether a California charge of conspiracy to sell and transport 
controlled substance qualifies as a removable offense for immigration pur-
poses.30 Second, whether the noncitizen can satisfy her burden of proof for 
cancellation of removal with an inconclusive record for her state convic-
tion.31 This section describes Marinelarena and the arguments used by the 
government and petitioner employing interpretations of the categorical ap-
proach. 
                                               
24 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 6, at 38–39. 
25 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 191 (citation and quotation omitted). 
26 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 6, at 39. 
27 Id. at 40. 
28 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 200–01. 
29 See Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 784. 
30 Id. at 785. 
31 See generally id. Briefly discussing the issue of expungement, the court summarized that around the 
same time when the Petitioner filed for cancellation of removal, she also applied in state court to vacate 
her conspiracy conviction. For that reason, the Petitioner argued that the court should include the ex-
pungement of her conspiracy conviction and thereby find her not convicted of a removable offense. 
However, the court dismissed her argument. 
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A. The Government Applied the Categorical Approach and the Modified 
Categorical Approach and was Unable to Prove the State Conviction a 
Removable Offense.  
On March 23, 2007, the petitioner, an undocumented noncitizen, was 
convicted of transporting a controlled substance and was sentenced to 136 
days of imprisonment and three years of probation.32 Two days after the 
conviction, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) initiated removal pro-
ceeding against the petitioner on grounds of her overstay as a removable al-
ien.33 She conceded to removability and subsequently petitioned for cancel-
lation of removal.34 The immigration judge denied relief contending that the 
petitioner had failed to meet her burden of proof to show that her state 
charge was not a removal offense.35 On appeal, the BIA upheld the decision 
on the same reasoning. The petitioner subsequently filed for review with the 
9th Circuit.36 
At the appeal level, the court employed the categorical approach and the 
modified categorical approach to examine whether the petitioner's convic-
tion under the state qualifies as a federally removable offense.37 As ex-
plained in Part I, for a state statute to be a categorical match with the federal 
one, the court reasoned, the state law must "proscribe the same amount of or 
less conduct than that qualifying as a federal controlled substance of-
fense."38 Upon finding that the petitioner could be convicted for any crimi-
nal conspiracy under Section 182(a)(1), the court found the state statute 
overbroad and therefore a categorical mismatch.39 However, the court also 
found the state statute divisible, because California requires unanimous jury 
agreement on "which felony defendants conspired to commit, and if that 
                                               
32 Id. at 784 (describing that the Petitioner was found transporting three bags containing heroin, which is 
a state as well as federally listed controlled substance); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 182(a)(1) (Deering 
2017). 
33 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 784; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (2008). 
34 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 784–85 ("To be eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 
§1229b, a petitioner must meet the following requirements: (1) have been physically present in the Unit-
ed States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of application; 
(2) have been a person of good moral character during that period; (3) not have been convicted of, as 
applicable here, a controlled substance offense; and (4) show that removal would cause "exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to a family member who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence."); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2008).  
35 See Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 784. 
36 Id. at 783. 
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felony is divided into degrees," the statute is divided by "alternative means 
by which a defendant might commit the same crime."40  
Because the statute was found to be overbroad and divisible, it warranted 
further inquiry into the petitioner's conviction record.41 At the modified cat-
egorical approach stage, nevertheless, the court still arrived at a mismatch. 
Although the criminal complaint does identify transportation of heroin as 
one of the overt acts alleged as part of the charged conspiracy, the conspira-
cy count to which the petitioner pleaded guilty does not corroborate that.42 
While there are no other available documents, "'charging papers alone are 
never sufficient' to establish the elements of conviction."43 With a lack of 
relevant record to specify the actual conviction, the court pronounced the 
state charge and the federal statute a mismatch and the petitioner not re-
movable for the conspiracy offense. 
B. The Government Found the Noncitizen Ineligible for Relief Since the 
Inconclusive Record Cannot Affirmatively Disqualify the Conspiracy 
Charge. 
While the court deemed the state conspiracy charge not a categorically 
removable offense, it nonetheless found the petitioner ineligible for cancel-
lation of removal for failing to prove "her conviction did not relate to a fed-
erally controlled substance."44 The court referred to its prior decision in 
Young v. Holder that, "a petitioner cannot carry the burden of demonstrating 
eligibility for cancellation of removal by establishing an inconclusive rec-
ord of conviction."45 Additionally, the court contended that, under the feder-
al statutory prescription, it established that the burden of proof would be on 
the moving party seeking relief and the party would lose if the record were 
inconclusive.46  
To buttress its reasoning, the court emphasized that its decision in Young 
was not "clearly irreconcilable" with the Supreme Court's holding in 
Moncrieffe v. Holder, since the former concerned cancellation while the lat-
ter concerned removability.47 The court argued that, while the Moncrieffe 
                                               
40 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 786–87 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Lopez, 864 F.3d 1034, 1039 
(9th Cir. 2017); People v. Horn, 524 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Cal. 1974)). 
41 Id. at 787. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. (quoting Lara-Chacon v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
44 Id. at 788; Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2012). 
45 Young, 697 F.3d at 990. 
46 Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (2006) (“An alien applying for relief or protection from removal has the 
burden of proof to establish that the alien [is eligible]. . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (2009). 
47 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 792; see also Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 184. 
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court says that its analysis for determining whether a particular state convic-
tion is categorically a federally removable crime is the same in cancellation 
contexts, the Supreme Court failed to delineate any difference in the burden 
of proof and did not even mention the topic.48 Furthermore, because 
Moncrieffe only discussed the categorical approach, its holding does not 
pertain to the present discussion, "which pertained only to the operation of 
the burden of proof when the modified categorical approach applies."49 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The 9th Circuit's Reasoning Was Flawed Because It Has Misunderstood 
the Applicable Contexts of the Categorical Approach. 
When the Marinelarena court argued that the Moncrieffe decision did not 
necessarily negate its Young decision, it is not entirely wrong. That is, the 
Moncrieffe court was indeed silent as to whether an inconclusive record sat-
isfies the noncitizen's burden of proof for cancellation of removal. Howev-
er, the Supreme Court was loud and clear in one very important principle: 
"our analysis is the same in both contexts."50 Be it a determination of re-
movability or cancellation, the Moncrieffe court reasoned that, "conviction 
is the 'relevant statutory hook.'"51 In other words, whether a noncitizen is 
removable or eligible for relief depends on whether "a conviction of the 
state offense 'necessarily involved. . .facts equating to the generic federal 
offense."52 If the analysis points to ambiguity in the state conviction record, 
it means that "the conviction 'did not necessarily involve facts that corre-
spond to an offense punishable'" and the noncitizen is not convicted of a 
deportable offense.53 In sum, the categorical approach is the ultimate litmus 
test in crime-based immigration: if a noncitizen is not convicted, he or she 
is neither removable nor ineligible for relief. Therefore, by putting remova-
bility and cancellation into separate analytical contexts, the 9th Circuit 
queued a head-on collision with Moncrieffe and built its reasoning on a 
flawed foundation.  
                                               
48 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 192 n.4; Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 790–91. 
49 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 794 (emphasis omitted). 
50 Moncrieffe v, 569 U.S. at 192 n.4. 
51 Id. at 191. 
52 Id. at 190 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24). 
53 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 793 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
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B. The 9th Circuit Has Misunderstood the Categorical Approach and the 
Modified Approach 
In Marinelarena, the 9th Circuit reasoned that since the modified cate-
gorical approach was an inquiry of "a mixed question of law and fact," it 
warrants further factual finding to satisfy the burden of proof.54 In 
Moncrieffe, however, the Supreme Court emphasized that the modified cat-
egorical approach is not an independent, separate analysis, but a part of the 
categorical approach as a whole.55 The same contention was illustrated in 
Descamps v. United States, in which the Supreme Court classified the mod-
ified categorical approach as an implemental tool applied only when "a 
statute lists multiple, alternative elements, and so effectively creates 'several 
different. . .crimes.'"56 Ultimately, despite its method of inquiry, the modi-
fied categorical approach serves but one identical purpose with the categor-
ical approach: to determine whether a noncitizen is convicted of a state of-
fense that "necessarily involved facts equating to the generic federal 
offense."57  
To regard the modified categorical approach simply as a separate, factual 
inquiry, as the 9th Circuit contended, clearly demonstrates a profound mis-
understanding.58 While the modified categorical approach examines factual 
documents, the analysis does not aim for facts. Integral to and congruent 
with the core concept of the categorical approach, the modified categorical 
approach is an "element-centric" analysis.59 According to the Court, the 9th 
Circuit's decision runs contrary to Congress' intent that the examination of 
relevant conviction documents is meant to determine "which statutory 
phrase was the basis for the conviction”, not to "discover what the defend-
ant actually did."60 Under the 9th Circuit's reasoning, the modified categori-
cal approach became a creature of its own making, disconnected and contra-
ry to the element-centric principle of the categorical approach. It turned the 
process of element-finding into one of fact-finding. These facts may or may 
not be permitted in the analysis: any facts disclosing the noncitizen's actual 
                                               
54 Id. at 791 (“Although the modified categorical approach, like the categorical approach, involves some 
strictly legal issues—such as a statute's divisibility—the inquiry into the which part of a divisible statute 
underlies the petitioner's crime of conviction is, if not factual, at least a mixed question of law and 
fact."). 
55 See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190; see also Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 794 (Tashima, J., dissenting). 
56 Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2285 (quoting Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009)). 
57 Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 190 (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24). 
58 See Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 791. 
59 Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2287. 
60 Id. at 2287 (2013) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010)). 
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conduct, according to Moncrieffe, are irrelevant and barred from being ad-
mitted into the analysis.61 
C. The 9th Circuit's Reasoning is Flawed Because It Misjudges the 
Meaning of Ambiguity  
In Marinelarena, the 9th Circuit failed to find Ms. Marinelarena convict-
ed under the federal statute, because the ambiguous state record "cannot 
conclusively connect the transportation of heroin with her conviction."62 
However, by finding her ineligible for relief for precisely the same reason, 
the court is implementing a double standard. The government cannot find 
her deportable because it cannot prove she was convicted of a federal con-
trolled substance offense, but neither is she eligible for relief because she 
cannot prove that she was not convicted of federal controlled substance of-
fense. Under the court's reasoning, the ambiguity afforded by the record in-
directly satisfies the government's burden of proof for removability. In other 
words, ambiguity means the noncitizen was convicted of a federally remov-
able offense.  
Judge Tajima, however, critics the majority's reasoning and referred to it 
as clearly irreconcilable with Moncrieffe. She writes,  
Young holds that ambiguity in the record as to whether the noncitizen commit-
ted an aggravated felony means that she was convicted of the offense for pur-
poses of the immigration statutes. Moncrieffe holds the opposite: If the record 
does not conclusively establish that the noncitizen committed the offense, then 
she was not convicted of the offense for purposes of the immigration statutes.63 
CONCLUSION 
Though the Supreme Court is still largely silent to the issue at play in 
Marinelarena v. Session, the 9th Circuit rested its decision on a structurally 
flawed argument. By misinterpreting the categorical approach, the 9th Cir-
cuit turned the noncitizen's burden of proof for relief a grossly unfair one. 
In its reasoning, the noncitizen would be left with two choices: one, to be 
subject to a much heavier burden of enquiry into the factual details in order 
to satisfy her burden of proof; or two, to be deemed ineligible for relief de-
spite no crime-based removability ever being successfully established. De-
spite it being a clear conundrum, neither of the two options is a viable solu-
tion, especially when the noncitizen's bargaining power is significantly 
                                               
61 See Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 200. 
62 Marinelarena, 869 F.3d at 787. 
63 Id. at 793–94. 
10
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 11
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol21/iss2/11
Do Not Delete 3/14/18  8:40 PM 
2018] CRIMINALIZATION OF THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 157 
weaker than that of the government. Until the Supreme Court makes any 
further clarifications, the 9th Circuit is still bound by the proper application 
of the categorical approach and obliged to honor its key principle, that is, 
effectiveness and fairness. To act in any way astray from it, however com-
pelling the government's imperatives may be, would be fundamentally dis-
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